

MILITARY

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PH CDRUSAOPSGP PT HEADE NO //IACDC-L//  
 TO AIG 9194  
 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA OASDMC //IDC/DCD/ETP/CNEI/HSG/OSR/ME/M/E/SF/D/  
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 RUEHNO/USDAO MOSCOW USSR  
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 RUEDAYS/PSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA //ORXST-SRI//  
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SECTION 01 OF 04

SUCCESS (M) (2)

SUBJ: [REDACTED] /USSR/COMBAT READINESS IN VARIOUS SOVIET  
 GROUND FORCES UNITS (U)

DIA PASS TO DB-1043/36-101/US-10

FBI PASS TO JAMES R. SCHRECKER

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: USSR (UR)

2. (U) IR NO: [REDACTED]

SUCCESS (M) (2)

3. (U) TITLE: COMBAT READINESS IN VARIOUS SOVIET GROUND FORCES  
 UNITS (U)

4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 880009-790000

5. (U) ORIG: PROJECT SEEK, DET L, USAOPSGP, INSCOM, PT HEADE, MD

6. (U) NEW REFS: [REDACTED]

SUCCESS (M) (2)

7. [REDACTED] SOURCE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE PROVIDED THIS INFORMATION  
 FORTNIGHTLY AND WITHOUT EVASION.

SUCCESS (b) (2)

8. (C) SUMMARY: THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON SOVIET

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 TOR: [REDACTED]

GROUND FORCES COMBAT READINESS INCLUDING GRADES/STANDARDS FOR INSPECTIONS, CONSEQUENCES/RESULTS OF INSPECTIONS, TRAINING, AND A PERSONAL APPRAISAL OF COMBAT READINESS. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION IS ALSO PROVIDED ON CONSCRIPT MEDICAL SCREENING AND MEDICAL SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN. THIS REPORT CENTERS ON ACTIVITIES IN THE LENINGRAD, CENTRAL ASIAN, AND CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS [REDACTED]

USC 665 (b) (2)

9A. (U) DETAILS:

1. ~~ACT~~ CATEGORIES OF READINESS: GARRISON READINESS, SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS ("CONSTANT READINESS"), VARIED SOMEWHAT FROM ONE GARRISON TO ANOTHER, DEPENDING ON TYPE OR STATUS OF UNIT MISSION, STRENGTH, AND LOCATION. THE RESPONSIVENESS TO AN ALERT NEAR AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER OR IN A GROUP OF FORCES WAS HIGHER THAN THAT IN A LOW STRENGTH MOTORIZED RIFLE UNIT LOCATED IN AN INTERIOR GARRISON. NOTIFICATION OF "INCREASED READINESS" (POVYSHENNAYA BOYEGOTOVOST') WAS GIVEN BY EITHER A MESSENGER OR TELEPHONE. LEAVES WERE CANCELLED AND THERE COULD BE A SELECTIVE OR GENERAL MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES. AN ALERT WAS GENERALLY CALLED AFTER "INCREASED READINESS" WAS ORDERED AND BEFORE "FULL READINESS" (POLNAYA BOYEGOTOVOST') WAS DECLARED. "FULL READINESS" WAS ORDERED IN SOME AREAS DURING THE CZECH AND AFGHANISTAN CRISES. READINESS DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESERVE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS, USUALLY REFERRED TO AS GUERRILLAS (PARTIZANY). THEIR RECORDS WERE MAINTAINED AT THE LOCAL MILITARY COMMISSARIAT (VOYENKOMAT-VK) AND A ROSTER OF THEM BY DESIGNATED POSITION WAS MAINTAINED IN THE "MOBILIZATION ROOM" (MOBKOMNATA) OF THE UNIT THEY WERE TO JOIN IN CASE OF A SELECTIVE OR GENERAL MOBILIZATION. [REDACTED]

2. ~~ACT~~ CADRE AND DEPLOYABLE UNITS: SOURCE WAS NOT CERTAIN OF THE EXACT MEANING OF THE TERMS CADRE DIVISION AND CADRE REGIMENT (KADROVOYANNAYA DIVIZIYA I KADROVOYANNYY POLK). ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THE TERMS APPLIED TO THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF OFFICERS WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE CALLED UP IN TIME OF MOBILIZATION TO BRING THE DIVISIONS/REGIMENTS UP TO STRENGTH. SOURCE WAS ALSO LESS THAN CLEAR ON MEAN-

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ING OF TERMS "DEPLOYABLE, SEMI-DEPLOYABLE, AND NON-DEPLOYABLE".  
ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED BOTH THE ASSAULT CROSSING AND TANK BATTALIONS  
[REDACTED] TO BE "RAZVERNUTYYE" UNITS.

3. (U) ALERTS: THE TRAINING ALERT (UCHENAYA TREVOGA) WAS DESIGN-  
ED TO ASSEMBLE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. THIS SOMETIMES RESULTED IN  
A CALL-UP OF OFFICERS AND OCCASIONALLY INVOLVED A MOVEMENT AND A

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RUEOAYB/PSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA //ORIST-SRI//  
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TIME-TEST LOADING OF AMMUNITION. COMMO PERSONNEL WOULD OPEN THE  
RADIO NETS AND SOMETIMES VEHICLE MOTORS WOULD BE STARTED. THE  
COMBAT ALERT (BOYEYATA TREVOGA) WAS TO BE CALLED ONLY IN CASE OF  
NATIONAL TENSION OR IMPENDING HOSTILITIES.  
4. (U) ~~1st~~ SECOND GENERATION DIVISIONS: SOURCE WAS NOT FAMILIAR  
WITH THE TERM "SECOND GENERATION DIVISION", BUT WAS FAMILIAR WITH  
"COMMANDOS" (KOMANDY) WHICH HAD ONLY A COMMANDER, A POLITICAL OFFI-  
CER, AND ONE OR MORE PERSONS TO MAINTAIN AND GUARD THE WAREHOUSE/  
STORAGE AREA (SKLAD). THESE UNITS HAD ACTIVATION ORDERS IN A SECURE  
SAFE, MANNING ROSTERS (PROBABLY FOR RESERVISTS AND FILLERS TO BE  
DISPATCHED BY A MILITARY COMMISSARIAT), AND MAPS OF THE AREA WHERE  
THEY WERE EXPECTED TO TRAIN AND OPERATE.  
5. (U) ~~1st~~ SEMI-ANNUAL TROOP ROTATIONS: THE SEMI-ANNUAL (SPRING AND  
FALL) TROOP ROTATION (PEREDISLOKATSIYA) CONSISTED OF A MOBILIZATION/  
CALL-UP (PRIZYV) AND A DEMOBILIZATION (DEMOBILIZATSIYA). THIS  
ROTATION RESULTED IN REDUCED COMBAT READINESS IN SOURCE'S TANK AND  
ASSAULT CROSSING BATTALIONS.  
6. (U) ~~1st~~ READINESS INSPECTIONS: THE READINESS INSPECTIONS (OTSENKA  
BOYEGUTOVNOSTI) WERE TESTS (PROVERKI) CONDUCTED ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR

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(USUALLY SPRING AND FALL) BY ARMY, MILITARY DISTRICT, OR THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE MOD. THE UNIT TO BE INSPECTED ALWAYS KNEW THE DATE OF THE INSPECTION AT LEAST TWO MONTHS IN ADVANCE. THE INSPECTION WOULD LAST SEVERAL DAYS AND USUALLY CHECKED TROOP ASSEMBLY AND DEPLOYMENT. THIS INSPECTING TEAM WOULD REMAIN FROM THREE TO SEVEN DAYS AND THE INSPECTION MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE RAIL LOADING AND A FIELD EXERCISE (UCHENIYE). EXACTLY WHAT INSPECTING TEAM INSPECTED WHAT UNIT WITHIN THE DIVISION WAS GENERALLY LEFT UP TO THE DIVISION COMMANDER, WHO USUALLY LEAD THE HIGHEST RANKING TEAM TO THE NEAREST REGIMENT (OR BATTALION), WHICH WAS KNOWN AS THE "SNOW REGIMENT" (PARNYY POLK).

7. (C) GRADING: THE INSPECTORS WOULD GRADE BASED ON CHECK LISTS (ONE PER PHASE -- INCLUDING ALERT, MOVEMENT TO ASSEMBLY AREA, LOAD MARCH, RAIL LOADING, ETC). GRADES RANGED FROM EXCELLENT (FIVE-DILICHNO) THROUGH GOOD (FOUR-KHURDSHU) AND SATISFACTORY (THREE-UDOVLETVORITEL'NOY) TO TWO CATEGORIES OF UNSATISFACTORY (INEUDOVLETVORITEL'NOY-TWO, ONE). IF THERE WAS AN ACCIDENT IN ANY PHASE (BODILY INJURY, DEATH, OR DAMAGE TO A VEHICLE OR EQUIPMENT), THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE GRADE WAS SATISFACTORY. THE OFFICERS WERE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENT AND DUTY WITHIN THIRTY MINUTES! IF ALL WERE PRESENT IN HALF AN HOUR AS PRESCRIBED, THE UNIT GRADE FOR THIS PART OF THE READINESS TEST WOULD BE FIVE. THE EXACT TIME REQUIREMENTS VARIED FROM UNIT TO UNIT AND WERE DEPENDENT ON A UNIT'S LOCATION AND MISSION. ASSEMBLY CRITERIA/NORMS WITH WHICH SOURCE WAS FAMILIAR VARIED FROM THIRTY MINUTES TO TWO HOURS. THE OFFICERS WERE REQUIRED TO APPEAR WITH THEIR "ALERT BAG" (TREVODZNYI CHEMUDANI) IF THE NEWBORN UNDERWEAR, SHOES, FOOD, ETC, WERE ALL PRESENT AND PACKED AS PRESCRIBED. THE GRADE FOR THIS TEST CATEGORY WOULD BE FIVE. IN [REDACTED] BATTALION AND TANK BATTALION ABOUT 70 PERCENT OF THE GRADES BY CATEGORY WERE FOUR. THE GRADES DEPENDED LARGELY ON THE PERSONALITY OF THE INSPECTOR AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMANDER. NOW THE INSPECTORS WERE FED AND TREATED AS VERY IMPORTANT. IN MANY WAYS THE INSPECTION WAS A SUPERFICIAL ONE (POVERKHNAYA PROVERKA). THERE WAS NO DETAILED CHECK OF VEHICLE CONDITION (THEY PASSED AS LONG AS THEY COULD MOVE OR BE TOWED) AND THERE WAS NO INVENTORY OR INSPECTION OF SUPPLIES OR SPARE PARTS. THE ABSENCE OF ANY INSPECTION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES RESULTED IN FALSE RATINGS. SINCE SPARE PARTS LEVELS WERE OFTEN LOW AND EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES WERE FREQUENTLY PILFERED. THE THEFT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES (FOR PERSONAL/FAMILY USE AND SALE ON THE CIVILIAN BLACK MARKET) WAS PARTICULARLY FLAGRANT, ACUTE, AND PERVERSIVE. THE

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SUPPLIES IN THE MEDICAL BATTALION WERE REPLACED ONCE YEARLY AND WERE SOMETIMES VERY SHORT PRIOR TO THE ANNUAL REPLACEMENT.

4. (C) CONSEQUENCES OF READINESS INSPECTIONS: THE COMMANDER WAS HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE READINESS OF HIS UNIT. ABOUT FOUR WEEKS AFTER THE INSPECTION, THE FORMAL INSPECTION REPORT (RAZDOR PROVERKI/RAZDOR UCHENIYA) WAS RECEIVED. IF THE INSPECTION TEAM FROM THE GENERAL STAFF/MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE UNIT HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY OUTSTANDING, THE COMMANDER MIGHT RECEIVE AN ON-THE-SPOT ONE-GRADE PROMOTION. A LIEUTENANT [REDACTED] WAS PROMOTED BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF HIS TANK COMPANY IN A RIVER-CROSSING EXERCISE WHICH WAS PART OF THE READINESS INSPECTION. OTHER OFFICERS RECEIVED A CERTIFICATE (GRADOTA) WHICH COULD RESULT IN THEIR BEING SENT TO AN ADVANCED MILITARY SCHOOL. SERGEANTS AND SOLDIERS DISTINGUISHING THEMSELVES DURING THE INSPECTION RECEIVED A TEN-DAY LEAVE. OFFICERS IN A UNIT CITED FOR EXCELLENCE SOMETIMES RECEIVE ENGRAVED PATCHES. IF THE RESULTS OF

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 RUENFB/FBI RASNDG  
 RUEDAYB/FSYC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA //DHAST-SRI//  
 RUEDRUP/DIRUSANIIA FT DETRICK MD //SG-I-DI-CR//  
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THE INSPECTION WERE UNFAVORABLE (TWO OR THREE); THE COMMANDER'S PROMOTION COULD BE CANCELLED OR DELAYED AND A REPRIMAND (VYGOVOR) COULD BE GIVEN. THERE WAS PLENTY OF CRITICISM BUT NO CORRECTIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN; PARTICULARLY WITH COMMANDERS. IT WAS GENERALLY PERSONAL MISBEHAVIOR WHICH RESULTED IN TRANSFER, FINE, DEMOTION, OR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE FOR AN OFFICER.

9. (C) TRAINING: THE TRAINING YEAR (UCHEVNYY GOD), WHICH BEGAN IN OCTOBER, WAS DIVIDED INTO A WINTER AND SUMMER PERIODS. TRAINING INSPECTIONS OF MEDICAL UNITS WERE CONDUCTED BY THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT (MD) HEADQUARTERS OR THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE DIVISION. [REDACTED] BATTALION HAD ONE NIGHT FIRING EXERCISE EACH TRAINING PERIOD (EVERY SIX MONTHS) AND EACH TANK COMMANDER AND EACH GUNNER FIRED THREE ROUNDS OF SERVICE AMMUNITION.

10. (C) SOURCE'S APPRAISAL OF READINESS: THE HARVEST SEASON CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN COMBAT READINESS IN BOTH THE TANK AND ASSAULT CROSSING BATTALIONS. SINCE ALL OVERHAUL ADMINISTRATIVE VEHICLES WERE SENT AWAY FOR TWO TO THREE MONTHS WITH DRIVERS (JULY TO SEPTEMBER), THE BATTALIONS HAD TO LIMIT THEIR TRAINING AND ACTIVITIES. TRUCKS RETURNING FROM HARVEST DUTY WERE BADLY BATTERED.

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SOME WERE INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS AND DID NOT RETURN. OTHERS WERE SET UP THAT THEY REQUIRED REPLACEMENT OR MAJOR OVERHAUL. SOME PERSONNEL ALSO DID NOT RETURN FOR NUMEROUS, ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. THE ANNUAL CALL-UP OCCURRED IN SEPTEMBER AND WAS CARRIED OUT IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER. ABOUT ONE FOURTH OF THE UNITS PERSONNEL ARRIVED AND DEPARTED DURING THE OCTOBER-DECEMBER (AND MARCH-JUNE) PERIOD. THE UNITS WERE FAIRLY PROFICIENT DURING JUNE-JULY AND SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER. EARLY JULY WAS PROBABLY WHEN UNITS WERE MOST COMBAT-PROFICIENT AND COMBAT-READY. DURING THESE PERIODS, UNITS WERE USUALLY IN THE FIELD OR AT A TRAINING AREA.

11. ~~MEDICAL SCREENING OF CONSCRIPTS~~

DURING THIS INDUCTION CYCLE SOME 500 CONSCRIPTS WERE TO BE INDUCTED; OF WHICH 250 WERE SENT TO GROUP SOVIET FORCES GERMANY (GSFG), PERSONNEL SENT TO GSFG WERE TO BE FREE OF STOMACH DISEASES, HAVE NORMAL BLOOD PRESSURE, GOOD VISION (NO GLASSES), NO HEPATITIS, AND SHORT ENOUGH FOR TANK CREW DUTY (175 CM). NO CENTRAL ASIANS WERE TO BE SENT FOR TANK CREW DUTY, BUT THEY COULD BE SENT FOR GROUND FORCES RIFLEMAN DUTY. ALSO NO CENTRAL ASIANS (TATAREY) WERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COMMUNICATIONS OR TRAINING DUTIES. THE CONSTRUCTION FORCES TOOK THE PETTY CRIMINALS (PRISONERS), THE ILL, AND THOSE WITH FLAT FEET. THE KGB DID ADDITIONAL SCREENING TO DETERMINE POLITICAL RELIABILITY FOR SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS. MOST OF THE INDUCTEES NOT SENT TO GSFG OR CONSTRUCTION BATTALION DUTY IN THIS PARTICULAR CYCLE WERE SENT TO SEMIPALATINSK (50204/50166/USBN) FOR UNKNOWN ASSIGNMENTS.

12. ~~SPECULATION ON MEDICAL SERVICE IN AFGHANISTAN~~ SOURCE KNEW SEVERAL PERSONNEL FROM Leningrad

WHO WERE RECRUITED OR SENT TO DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN. SEVERAL OFFICERS FROM THE ACADEMY WERE KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN. NUMEROUS DOCTORS AND NURSES WERE RECRUITED IN Leningrad FOR SERVICE IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE PROMISED HIGH PAY -- ABOUT SIX OF SEVEN TIMES THE USUAL PAY -- AS MOD CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (VOLNOVATENNYYE).

13. ~~DEPLOYMENT OF MEDICAL BATTALIONS IN AFGHANISTAN~~ SOURCE SPECULATED AND RECALLED COMMENTS FROM ASSOCIATES THAT INDICATED THAT MEDICAL BATTALIONS IN AFGHANISTAN WERE LOCATED MORE THAN FIVE KILOMETERS FROM SUPPORTED UNITS AND WERE USUALLY SET UP SEMI-

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INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC //IDC/DCD/ETP/CRES/RSG/OSR/NE/M/E/SF/D/  
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PERMANENTLY IN VILLAGES. EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED WAS LARGELY BY HELICOPTER. SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES WERE CONSIDERABLE AND SIGNIFICANT. IF POSSIBLE, MEDICAL BATTALIONS WOULD TRY TO LOCATE NEAR A RIVER (FOR WATER SOURCE) AND NEAR A NATURAL HELICOPTER LANDING AREA FOR EASE OF EVACUATION. HOWEVER, THE ENGINEERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING WATER AND BUILDING A HELICOPTER PAD IF NONE WERE AVAILABLE. THE MEDICAL BATTALIONS AND THEIR ENGINEER SUPPORT WERE DIRECTED/COORDINATED BY THE CHIEF OF REAR SERVICES. (NACHALNIK TYLA).

98. (C) ORIG CTST: THIS IS THE SECOND REPORT TAKEN FROM SOURCE. THE FIRST REPORT,

10. (U) PROJ NOT SUBCS52 (u) (2)

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE

12. (U) SPEC INST: THE CONTROL MARKINGS ASSIGNED TO THIS REPORT ARE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE IDENTIFICATION AND VIABILITY OF A SENSITIVE COLLECTION PROGRAM. DIRM NO.

14. (U) APP BY: JOMY L. GREIFE, LTC, MI, COM, USAUSDP, INSCOM.

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15. (U) REU EVAL: YESI REL TO: NONE

16. (U) ENCL: NA

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: NA

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